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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION LAW
PATRICK J. KEARNS*

T

HE FOLLOWING ARTICLE addresses recent developments
in aviation law and the aviation field generally over the past
year, i.e., in the time frame of approximately January 2018 to
January 2019. This Article will examine a selection of new laws,
changes to federal regulations, and case law decisions that impact the field of aviation, including a comprehensive new set of
federal statutes and cases involving federal preemption, consumer protections, aircraft leasing, and more.
I.

FAA REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2018

One of the more significant events in the past year with respect to the field of aviation is the enactment of the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) Reauthorization Act of 2018
(FAA Reauthorization Act), signed into law by President Trump
on October 5, 2018.1
The FAA Reauthorization Act sanctions the FAA for the next
five fiscal years, 2019–2023, which represents the longest funding authorization period for FAA programs since 1982.2 The
FAA Reauthorization Act is extensive. In addition to the numerous FAA-related funding provisions, it also addresses, regulates,
or otherwise impacts a variety of issues spanning across the aviation sphere, including airport infrastructure and safety, unmanned aerial systems (drones), consumer information and
safety, air ambulance billing, and aircraft leasing. Some of the
FAA Reauthorization Act’s provisions serve to create new rules
or regulations, while much of it either requires or empowers the
Secretary of Transportation to investigate, evaluate, or otherwise
* Partner, Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, San Diego office.
1 FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254, 132 Stat. 3186.
2 Ben Husch, Congress Passes 5-Year FAA Reauthorization Act, NCSL BLOG (Oct. 4,
2018), www.ncsl.org/blog/2018/10/04/congress-passes-5-year-faa-reauthoriza
tion-act.aspx [https://perma.cc/HLU8-QYDR].

165

166

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[84

analyze a particularly pressing issue. A selection of these new
regulations, laws, and programs will be discussed below.
A.

CONSUMER PROTECTIONS

AND

SAFETY

The FAA Reauthorization Act sets in place a host of new rules
and regulations with regard to commercial air travel, consumer
and aviation safety, and unmanned aircraft systems, among
many others. Rules and regulations of this type often not only
address recent concerns or events but also often become fertile
ground for future litigation, as defense lawyers will agree.
A variety of straightforward but important consumer rules
were set into place by the FAA Reauthorization Act. Section 403,
for example, officially bans all cell phone calls during commercial flights.3 Specifically, that section amends 49 U.S.C. § 41725
to prohibit any individual from engaging in “voice communications” using a mobile device during a flight, excepting on-duty
flight crew, flight attendants, and law enforcement officials acting in their official capacity.4 Section 409 bans the use of electronic cigarettes on all flights (by virtue of officially equating
their use with smoking).5 Section 417 prohibits a passenger
from putting any live animals in an overhead bin on a commercial flight.6
In addition to these types of specific prohibitions, the FAA
Reauthorization Act generally puts a heavy focus on the flow of
information to the consumer, consumer rights, and the consumer complaint process. It instructs the Secretary of Transportation to investigate, create committees, and report on a variety
of consumer issues, including: the causes of airline delays or
cancellations;7 evaluating the feasibility of processes to inform
consumers of actual flight times;8 and the creation and display
of “passenger rights” documents.9
Presumably in response to one highly publicized incident in
2017 involving the involuntary removal of a ticketed passenger
from a commercial airliner to make space for airline employ3
4
5
6
7
8
9

FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 § 403.
Id. (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 41725).
Id. § 409 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 41706).
Id. § 417 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44739).
Id. § 413.
Id. § 406.
Id. § 429.
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ees,10 Congress enacted section 425 of the FAA Reauthorization
Act, entitled the “TICKETS Act” for short.11 The TICKETS Act
provides that an air carrier may not deny a “revenue passenger”
who has a “confirmed reservation” the “permission to board”
nor remove that passenger from the aircraft once the passenger:
(1) has checked in for the flight prior to the deadline; and (2)
has their boarding pass scanned by the gate agent.12 Exceptions
exist, of course, if the passenger poses a “safety, security, or
health risk” or if the passenger is engaging in disruptive or unlawful behavior.13 Stated differently and in colloquial parlance,
once you’re on board the flight, you can no longer get
“bumped.”
B.

SERVICE ANIMALS

Section 437 of the FAA Reauthorization Act reflects Congress’s attempts to address the service animal situation by ordering the Secretary of Transportation to investigate and conduct a
rulemaking proceeding to develop, among other things, a definition for the term “service animal” and minimum standards for
implementing related rules.14 These include, for example: examination of whether to require photo identification for a service animal and, interestingly, the type of service the animal
provides to the passenger; whether to require documentation
from a physician; and whether to require third-party proof of
training for a service animal.15 Service animals, support animals,
and the interplay between balancing consumer needs, safety regulations, and both state and federal statutes is an ongoing challenge. It is clear from the numerous sections of the FAA
Reauthorization Act devoted to such issues that Congress is taking steps to address these challenges.
C.

AIR AMBULANCE BILLING

Air ambulances have become “a familiar part of emergency
healthcare response. All over the country, but particularly in ru10 See, e.g., Maggie Hassan, Making Airline Travel Safe for All, BOS. GLOBE (Nov.
19, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2018/11/19/making-airlinetravel-safe-for-all/dw3ybB2d19Q1xZKl1Uos7M/story.html [https://perma.cc/6Y
YJ-H9C3].
11 FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 § 425.
12 Id. § 425(b).
13 Id. § 425(c).
14 Id. § 437.
15 Id.
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ral areas, air ambulances can play a vital and life-saving role in
responding to medical emergencies.”16 Often the high costs of
air ambulance services, however, if not covered or fully covered
by a patient’s insurance, may then be borne by the patient themselves—a practice known as “balance-billing.”17 Balance-billing,
and the costs of air ambulance services in general, has been the
subject of numerous lawsuits, articles, blogs, and the like.18 Congress was alerted to growing consumer concerns related to balance-billing and the FAA Reauthorization Act seeks to address
the issue in various ways.
The FAA Reauthorization Act provides for increased data collection with respect to air ambulance pricing and for increased
information to consumers.19 It further requires the creation of a
committee of interested parties to review options to improve the
disclosure of fees and costs related to air ambulance services and
to “protect consumers from balance billing.”20 It further provides for greater authority and oversight by the Secretary of
Transportation with respect to air ambulance billing practices.21
Notably, the FAA Reauthorization Act also amends 49 U.S.C.
§ 41712(a) to include air ambulance companies within the
scope of consumer protection laws regarding unfair and deceptive practices or competition.22 While Congress certainly has an
interest in evaluating consumer protections with respect to any
medical-billing-related circumstance, it will have to carefully balance those concerns with the obvious benefits derived from increased air ambulance operations.
D.

UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS

Congress devoted significant attention to the use and regulation of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) (also known as drones)
in the FAA Reauthorization Act. In large part, the focus of the
UAS legislation involves the evaluation and development of
Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Cheatham, 910 F.3d 751, 757 (4th Cir. 2018).
Id.
18 Air Evac EMS was ultimately resolved via a federal preemption analysis, but
the suit stemmed from a balance-billing related concern. Id. at 769–70. That case
is discussed in more detail below. See also Jen Christensen, Sky-High Prices for Air
Ambulances Hurt Those They are Helping, CNN (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.cnn.
com/2018/11/26/health/air-ambulance-high-price/index.html [https://
perma.cc/8NFT-NF3A].
19 FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 §§ 314, 418.
20 Id. § 418(a).
21 Id. § 420; see also §§ 418–419.
22 Id. § 419(b) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 41712(a)).
16
17
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“plans,” for lack of a better description, to manage UAS operations moving forward in our increasingly modern aviation
rubric.23
To illustrate, section 342 requires the Secretary of Transportation to update the existing FAA comprehensive plan to “develop
a concept of operations for the integration of unmanned aircraft into the national airspace system.”24 The FAA Reauthorization Act provides a host of safety and certification standards for
all types of public and private UAS operations as well. Section
349, for example, provides standards for permissible recreational UAS operations: (1) the UAS is flown within the visual
line of site of the operator or a spotter in communication with
the operator; (2) its operation does not interfere in any way with
manned aircraft; (3) it remains below 400 feet above ground
level; and (4) the operator has “passed an aeronautical knowledge and safety test,” among others.25
Considered as a whole, the FAA Reauthorization Act reflects
Congress’s understanding that UASs are here to stay. UASs serve
a variety of valuable services across any number of public and
private service areas but also present unique and highly consequential safety concerns. Section 362 bears out the latter, noting: “[i]t is the sense of Congress” that “the unauthorized
operation of unmanned aircraft near airports presents a serious
hazard to aviation safety.”26 Severe penalties are authorized for
those who violate UAS-related regulations and cause injury or
death.27
II.

AIRCRAFT LEASING AND RELATED LIABILITY

Liability stemming from aviation accidents involving leased
aircraft has been addressed by both a currently pending case in
the Ninth Circuit, as well as the FAA Reauthorization Act discussed above.
The FAA Reauthorization Act makes two small, yet significant,
changes to § 44112(b) of Title 49 of the United States Code,
which limits liability for aircraft owners and long-term lessors of
aircraft in the event of an aviation accident.28 Originally deSee id. §§ 222(b)(3)(E), 342–384.
Id. § 342(a).
25 Id. § 349 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44809) (not a comprehensive list of
elements).
26 Id. § 362.
27 See, e.g., id. § 384 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 39B).
28 Id. § 514 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44112(b)).
23
24
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signed to encourage and promote the financing and purchasing
of aircraft, 49 U.S.C. § 44112(b) essentially immunized aircraft
owners who had leased out their aircraft and were therefore not
in possession of or operating the aircraft at the time of an injury
or death due to an accident.29 The previous version of 49 U.S.C.
§ 44112(b) stated:
[a] lessor, owner, or secured party is liable for personal injury,
death, or property loss or damage on land or water only when a
civil aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller is in the actual possession or control of the lessor, owner, or secured party, and the personal injury, death, or property loss or damage occurs because
of—(1) the aircraft, engine, or propeller; or (2) the flight of, or
an object falling from, the aircraft, engine, or propeller.30

Section 514 of the FAA Reauthorization Act alters this language to strike the phrase “on land or water” and to add the
word “operational” before “control.”31 Thus, 49 U.S.C.
§ 44112(b) will read:
[a] lessor, owner, or secured party is liable for personal injury,
death, or property loss or damage only when a civil aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller is in the actual possession or operational control of the lessor, owner, or secured party, and the
personal injury, death, or property loss or damage occurs because of—(1) the aircraft, engine, or propeller; or (2) the flight
of, or an object falling from, the aircraft, engine, or propeller.32

The first change—striking the phrase “on land or water”—eliminates any remaining confusion regarding where the injured party
needed to be at the time of the incident for the liability shield to
apply. That is, when the former version of 49 U.S.C. § 44112(b)
was strictly construed, the physical location of the injured party
was significant.
To illustrate, in Vreeland v. Ferrer (a much discussed and somewhat novel case), the Florida Supreme Court found that 49
U.S.C. § 44112 did not preempt a Florida state law—and thus
did not serve to shield a lessor of an aircraft from liability—
based on the plaintiff’s physical presence in the aircraft itself.33
See 49 U.S.C. § 44112(b) (2012).
Id., amended by FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254, § 514,
132 Stat. 3186, 3358 (emphasis added).
31 FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 § 514 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 44112(b)).
32 49 U.S.C. § 44112(b), amended by FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L.
No. 115-254, § 514, 132 Stat. 3186, 3358.
33 Vreeland v. Ferrer, 71 So. 3d 70, 84 (2011).
29
30
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In Vreeland, the defendant was the owner of an aircraft who had
leased it for one year.34 During the lease period, the aircraft
crashed and fatally injured the pilot and passenger.35 The plaintiff was the estate of the passenger who filed suit against the
owner/lessor of the aircraft alleging state law tort claims.36 Both
lower courts ultimately found that 49 U.S.C. § 44112(b) applied
and thus immunized the owner/lessor.37
The Florida Supreme Court reversed.38 The court, seizing on
the “on land or water” language of the statute, held that
§ 44112(b) only applies to people or property that were “physically on the ground or in the water” (i.e., only those standing on
the ground and underneath the aircraft when it crashed).39 Because the plaintiff (the passenger) was inside the aircraft at the
time of its crash and not underneath it, the Vreeland court found
§ 44112(b) inapplicable and the state law claim was allowed to
proceed.40 Congress’s enactment of section 514 of the FAA
Reauthorization Act eliminates the phrase “on land or water”
and thus effectively overturns the Vreeland court’s decision, or at
least eliminates any precedential value the decision may have
had.41
As of the date of this writing, another case involving an aircraft leasing issue, specifically involving the interpretation of 49
U.S.C. § 44112, is currently pending in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.42 In Escobar, the plaintiff is the
widow of a pilot who was operating a Eurocopter EC130 B4 helicopter in Hawaii when it crashed into mountainous terrain
while giving a tour of the islands.43 The company operating the
helicopter employed the plaintiff’s husband.44 Plaintiff brought
state law negligence and strict product liability claims against
both the manufacturer of the helicopter and the owner/lessor
Id. at 72.
Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 72–73.
38 Id. at 84.
39 Id. at 80.
40 Id. at 84.
41 See FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254, § 514, 132 Stat.
3186, 3358.
42 See Escobar v. Nevada Helicopter Leasing, LLC, No. 13-00598 HG-RLP, 2016
WL 3962805, at *1 (D. Haw. July 21, 2016), appeal docketed, No. 17-15590 (9th Cir.
Mar. 30, 2017). Wilson Elser and the author of this Article represent the defendant and respondent in this matter.
43 Id. at *1, *4.
44 Id. at *1.
34
35
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of the helicopter.45 The owner/lessor defendant, Nevada Helicopter Leasing, LLC (Nevada Leasing), is a Nevada corporation,
which purchases helicopters and engages in long-term leases of
those helicopters with the operator in Hawaii.46
At the district court level, Nevada Leasing moved for summary
judgment, arguing that 49 U.S.C. § 44112(b) applied because
the owner/lessor of the aircraft engaged in a long-term lease.47
Specifically, Nevada Leasing asserted that it had neither actual
possession nor control over the aircraft, and thus § 44112(b)
preempted the plaintiff’s state law claims and immunized it
from liability.48 The district court analyzed Nevada Leasing’s
preemption claim under the principle of conflict preemption.49
Reviewing the legislative history of 49 U.S.C. § 44112, the court
noted that Congress “intended to make it clear that an owner or
lessor of an aircraft would not be liable unless it had actual possession or control over the aircraft.”50 The court held the plaintiff’s state law causes of action contravened Congress’s intent in
enacting § 44112; the plaintiff’s claims were therefore preempted by the Federal Aviation Act.51 The court further held
that 49 U.S.C. § 44112(b) exempted Nevada Leasing from liability because Nevada Leasing did not have “actual possession or
control” of the helicopter.52 Summary judgment was granted.53
Plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.54 On appeal, the plaintiff asserted that, while
the helicopter may have been in the possession of the operator,
the lease between the owner and the operator nevertheless gave
Nevada Leasing sufficient “legal” control over the flight to remove the matter from the purview of 49 U.S.C. § 44112(b).55
Id.
Id.
47 Id. at *1, *4.
48 See id. at *1, *10.
49 Id. at *6. Conflict preemption is a type of implied preemption that “arises
when compliance with both federal and state law is impossible or when a state law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress in enacting the federal law.” Id. at *5–6.
50 Id. at *7.
51 Id. at *8.
52 Id. at *13.
53 Id.
54 See generally Plaintiff-Appellant’s Opening Brief, Escobar v. Nevada Helicopter Leasing, LLC, No. 17-15590 (9th Cir. Oct. 10, 2017). Wilson Elser and the
author of this Article served as counsel for Nevada Helicopter Leasing on appeal.
55 Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 2, Escobar, No. 17-15590 (9th Cir. Feb.
22, 2018).
45
46
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Nevada Leasing countered by asserting that the incident falls
squarely within the confines of 49 U.S.C. § 44112(b), which effectuates its plain language purpose of immunizing owners and
lessors, such as itself, from liability where it maintains no physical, operational, or other control over the flight or the aircraft.56
Moreover, Nevada Leasing argued that even if the terms of the
lease between it and the operator were relevant to the issue of
“control” within the meaning of the statute, the lease itself specifically delineates that the lessee/operator was to maintain possession and control of the aircraft at all times.57
The Escobar case was argued and submitted to the Ninth Circuit in October 2018, and a final decision on the case remains
pending as of the date of this writing.58
III.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION

Once again, the most significant preemption case in the last
year is the most recent iteration of Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive
Corporation.59 The Third Circuit’s decision in Sikkelee was issued
on October 25, 2018, and is the most recent of what is otherwise
a long and complex litigation history.60 To better understand
the issues and the scope of the new Sikkelee decision, some factual and legal background is appropriate.61
A.

THE INITIAL PROCEEDINGS

The Sikkelee lawsuit was initiated in 2007, two years after a
Cessna 172 pilot sustained fatal injuries during a plane crash in
North Carolina.62 The plaintiff asserted state law strict liability
and negligence claims against, among other defendants, Tex56 Defendant-Appellee’s Answering Brief at 2, Escobar, No. 17-15590 (9th Cir.
Jan. 2, 2018).
57 Id. at 3.
58 Editor’s Note: The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has since released
its opinion. See Escobar v. Nevada Helicopter Leasing, LLC, 756 F. App’x 724 (9th
Cir. 2019) (mem. op.). The court reversed the grant of summary judgment for
the defendant, holding there is “a genuine dispute as to whether Nevada Leasing
had ‘actual possession or control’ of the aircraft.” Id. at 725.
59 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 907 F.3d 701 (3d Cir. 2018).
60 See id. For clarity, reference to Sikkelee here will refer only to the recent October 2018 decision.
61 In the interest of brevity, however, both the facts and procedural history of
the Sikkelee decision presented here are summarized versions. There are additional “offshoot” decisions related to the Sikkelee case as well, but a discussion of
those is omitted here.
62 Sikkelee, 907 F.3d at 705, 707.
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tron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Division (Lycoming),
claiming the engine had failed to function properly due to a
design defect, specifically, a defect in the carburetor.63
Lycoming was issued the type certificate for its engine in 1966,
which included approval of the carburetor design (manufactured by a different company).64 Lycoming subsequently asked
the FAA to remove a requirement that certain bolts holding the
carburetor together be secured with safety wire, in favor of using
hex screws and lock tabs instead—a request the FAA permitted.65 In the years following this adjustment, the FAA notified
Lycoming on several occasions of instances where it appeared
the hex screws and lock tabs were not completely effective in
holding together the components of the carburetors installed in
its engines.66 Lycoming responded with a Service Bulletin in
1973, but the problems with loosening of the screws on the carburetor persisted.67 Precision Air Motive, which had acquired
the manufacturer of the carburetor, also began to “identif[y] a
trend” from multiple reports that the screws were coming loose
on the carburetor in the engine, and specifically on Cessna 172
aircraft.68
The engine installed on the aircraft at issue had been overhauled in 2004 and placed back into service.69 The carburetor
had been rebuilt; however, the rebuild was performed pursuant
to the active specifications and the existing certifications, which
called for the use of the hex screws and lock tabs.70 David Sikkelee rented the plane in 2005 and crashed shortly after takeoff,
suffering fatal injuries.71 Plaintiff alleged it was a loosening of
the screws and lock tabs on the carburetor that ultimately allowed the engine to malfunction and caused the Cessna to
crash.72
After some initial motion practice and an early dismissal, the
plaintiff filed an amended complaint that not only asserted the
state law strict products liability and negligence claims but also
incorporated claims of a violation of a “federal standard of care”
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See

at 704–05.
at 705.
at 706.
at 706–07.
at 707.
id. at 706–07.
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and alleged Lycoming had violated various FAA regulations.73
Lycoming filed a motion for partial summary judgment that the
district court granted by concluding that the FAA’s issuance of a
type certificate itself demonstrated that Lycoming had satisfied
any federal standard of care.74 Effectively, the district court’s ruling concluded that the FAA regulations field-preempted the
plaintiff’s claims.75
B.

THE FIRST APPEAL TO THE THIRD CIRCUIT:
FIELD PREEMPTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
granted an interlocutory appeal to evaluate the scope of field
preemption as to state law aircraft products liability claims.76
The Third Circuit reversed the trial court’s decision and held
that the doctrine of field preemption did not categorically apply
to state law products liability claims in the aviation field.77 Specifically, the Third Circuit held that the regulatory authorities
for aviation in the United States—the Federal Aviation Act, the
General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, and the various Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) promulgated by the FAA—do
not reflect an intention by Congress to preempt state law in the
“field” of aviation and do not create a federal standard of care
for injuries resulting from aircraft-related incidents.78 The court
also specifically found that the “type certification process cannot
as a categorical matter displace the need for compliance . . .
with state standards of care.”79
The Third Circuit therefore vacated the order granting of
summary judgment and remanded the case back to the district
court, noting that the case could proceed using a “state standard
of care,” but notably also “subject to traditional principles of
conflict preemption.”80 In summary, the Third Circuit rejected
the concept of a federal standard of care and, moreover, rejected the assertion that compliance with federal regulations or
the issuance of a type certificate results in the application of
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

Id. at 707.
Id.
Id. at 708.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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field preemption. It explicitly left open, however, the possibility
that a related doctrine, conflict preemption, may apply.
C.

THE REMAND

TO THE

DISTRICT COURT

Once back in the district court, Lycoming filed another motion for summary judgment, this time arguing the plaintiff’s
claims were preempted by federal law under the doctrine of
conflict preemption (i.e., the proverbial “door” explicitly left
open by the Third Circuit).81 While field preemption involves
the analysis of whether federal law occupies an entire “field” categorically, such as aviation-related state products liability claims,
conflict preemption has more layers. Two types of conflict preemption exist: (1) impossibility preemption, where a party asserts that compliance with both state and federal obligations or
duties simultaneously is impossible; or alternatively, (2) obstacle
preemption, which arises when compliance with both state and
federal laws or duties is possible, but compliance with the state
law is an obstacle to the purposes of the federal law.82 The court
explains that the “question for ‘impossibility’ [preemption] is
whether the private party could independently do under federal
law what state law requires of it.”83
Lycoming asserted the former; that is, it claimed impossibility
conflict preemption applied and asserted that its compliance
with the state law duties—the alleged duty to create a safer form
of lock system on the carburetor—was impossible to achieve independently and without the approval of the FAA.84 The district
court agreed with Lycoming and again granted summary judgment in favor of the defense.85 Again, plaintiff appealed to the
Third Circuit.86

Id.
Id. at 709.
83 Id. (citing PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 504 U.S. 604, 620 (2011)).
84 Id. at 708–09. Notably, the plaintiff’s specific claims on remand were that
Lycoming was required under state law to have used a different, safer design—
specifically, the use of a “safety wire” to secure the bolts on the carburetor. Id. at
710. This safety wire system, as noted above, was the original design in the original type certificate. As will be shown below, this fact bears on the outcome of the
case.
85 See id. at 708.
86 Id.
81
82
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THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S 2018 DECISION:
CONFLICT PREEMPTION

The present Sikkelee decision now focuses on conflict preemption analysis. Once again, however, the Third Circuit reversed
the trial court’s decision and held that conflict preemption does
not apply in this circumstance, or at least that the record was
insufficient for summary judgment.87
As it did at the trial court level, Lycoming argued that it could
not unilaterally change its type certificate without FAA approval
and thus could not alter the existing design of the carburetor,
precisely what the state law allegedly required it to do.88 It was
therefore impossible for it to comply with both federal and state
law.89
The Sikkelee court rejected this contention. Analogizing the
circumstances to a series of cases involving the Federal Drug Administration and drug manufacturing and product labels, the
Sikkelee court acknowledged the FAA’s role in type certificate
changes but ultimately held that Lycoming was not entitled to
the impossibility preemption defense unless it could present
“clear evidence that the [FAA] would not have approved a
change” to the type certificate.90 Stated another way, although
acknowledging that Lycoming would need to obtain FAA approval before compliance with both state and federal law was
possible, it nevertheless was required to prove that FAA approval
would not have been forthcoming to demonstrate impossibility.
Significantly, the court relied heavily on the fact that Lycoming had previously sought and obtained FAA approval for adjustments to its type certificate, to which the court commented that
approval had been obtained “in short order.”91 Specifically, the
court seized on the fact that Lycoming had reached out to the
FAA with regard to changing its original design in a successful
effort to remove the requirement that safety wires be used to
secure the carburetor parts in favor of hex screws and lock
tabs—a fact that, not coincidentally, was at the heart of the
plaintiff’s claim against Lycoming.92 Moreover, the court emphasized that both the FAA and Lycoming had been aware of
87
88
89
90
91
92

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 714–15.
at 713.
at 713–14 (citations and quotations omitted).
at 713.
at 713–14.
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the specific issue previously, suggesting that knowledge would
presumably have smoothed the way for a subsequent design
change.93 The Third Circuit concluded that when viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff (which it must
on summary judgment), the FAA “likely would have approved a
change [to the design].”94
Consequently, the Sikkelee court again vacated the award of
summary judgment and again has remanded the case back to
the trial court for further proceedings.95 As of the date of this
writing, the Sikkelee decision stands.
E.

THE DISSENTING OPINION

IN

SIKKELEE

For those in disagreement with the outcome of the Sikkelee decision, there is a very detailed dissenting opinion worth reviewing. The dissent notes that the majority’s recital of the
applicable question of law is correct and undisputed, but to determine whether impossibility conflict preemption applies, the
salient inquiry is “whether the private party could independently
do under federal law what state law requires of it.”96 The dissent
argues, however, that the majority was not faithful to this inquiry.97 Instead, while acknowledging Lycoming could not independently make changes to its design, the majority nevertheless
required additional proof beyond the scope of that inquiry.98
To this end, the dissenting opinion states, “[c]rucially, the
question is not whether a manufacturer may ever alter its product under the applicable federal regulatory scheme. Rather, the
question is whether a manufacturer may do so without prior
agency approval.”99 In essence, the dissenting opinion argues
that it does not matter whether FAA approval for a design
change would have been likely, welcomed, easy, or swift, but inId. at 714.
Id.
95 Id. at 714–15, 717. The court’s opinion also addressed and rejected Lycoming’s summary judgment on additional grounds, finding genuine issues of material fact with respect to, for example, the actual cause of the engine failure. Id. at
716. It did however affirm a partial grant of summary judgment in Lycoming’s
favor on another “failure-to-notify-the-FAA” claim, but that is not entirely germane to the focus of this Article and thus that aspect is not discussed other than
to note the Third Circuit again confirmed that there is no “federal standard of
care.” See id. at 716–17.
96 Id. at 719 (Roth, J., dissenting).
97 See id.
98 Id. at 723.
99 Id. at 720.
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stead only that approval on some level was required. It is that additional requirement, the dissent argues, that creates the basis
for the application of impossibility conflict preemption.
The dissent explains this position, stating:
[the] result is readily apparent when we consider the question of
impossibility in the precise language provided by the Supreme
Court: Could Lycoming independently do under federal law
what state law required of it, i.e., alter the design of the carburetor’s fastening mechanism from lock-tab washers to safety wire?
Under the applicable FAA regulations, the answer to that fundamental question is clearly no . . . .100

Thus, the mere fact that some additional approval by a thirdparty regulatory entity is required before Lycoming could comply with state law, the dissent argues, triggers the applicability of
impossibility conflict preemption.
To be sure, the 2018 Sikkelee decision strikes a blow to the impossibility conflict preemption defense in aviation products liability cases. The reasoning of the case poses a new and unique
hurdle by effectively adding a new element to the evidentiary
analysis. That is, Sikkelee suggests a defendant asserting impossibility conflict preemption must prove more than impossibility
“at the time,” but impossibility in the future, i.e., that even with
further efforts (such as seeking a change to a type certificate),
compliance with state law would have been impossible or unlikely. That said, the emphasis on the historical facts at issue in
Sikkelee (the long history of the FAA and others providing notice
to Lycoming of the issue, the prior design change and FAA approval, etc.) appear to bear heavily on the analysis and the outcome.101 Accordingly, a new case without those facts may
present a circumstance wherein an impossibility conflict preemption defense may be more viable.
IV.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION/AIR AMBULANCES &
BALANCE-BILLING

Another interesting federal preemption case comes out of the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Air Evac EMS, Inc. v.
Cheatham.102 While the result of the Air Evac EMS case is driven
by federal preemption analysis, the case is also notable because
it involves air ambulance billing—not only an emerging issue in
100
101
102

Id. at 723 (footnote omitted).
See id. at 714 (majority opinion).
910 F.3d 751 (4th Cir. 2018).
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litigation nationwide but also one given significant attention by
Congress in the FAA Reauthorization Act (a fact noted by the
court).103
Air Evac EMS arose out of West Virginia.104 The Fourth Circuit
began its analysis of the issues in that case with: (1) a detailed
(and informative) history of the market-driven system for commercial air travel; (2) Congress’s efforts to encourage growth
and competitiveness in the aviation sector through deregulation; and (3) the advent and operation of one of its primary
contemporary vehicles for doing so, the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978 (ADA).105 To achieve its goals, the ADA’s purpose
was to avoid “duplicative and inconsistent” layers of state and
federal regulatory oversight by imposing only a single layer of
federal regulation, administered by the Department of Transportation (leaving aviation safety to the FAA).106 To this end, the
ADA contains an express preemption clause, which currently
reads: “[A] State . . . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation,
or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a
price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air
transportation under this subpart.”107 The provision expresses
the “‘broad pre-emptive purpose’ that is consistent with the deregulatory aims of the statute.”108
One area of active and innovative growth in the aviation field
is the emergence of air ambulances.109 Air ambulances, while
providing an extremely valuable service, are expensive and, as
noted by the court, the cost of a single flight can be “tens of
thousands of dollars.”110 Some insurance companies, however,
have refused to cover all or part of these costs, which in turn has
prompted air ambulance companies to “[seek] payment directly
from the patients.”111 This practice of seeking payment for the
balance of the outstanding costs from the patient is known as
“balance-billing,” and “[t]he costs of these services have not
gone unnoticed.”112 The court in Air Evac EMS explained that
the Government Accountability Office issued a report to Con103
104
105
106
107
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109
110
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Id.
See
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

id. at 757.
at 758.
id. at 755–56.
at 756.
(citing 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2012)).
(internal citations omitted).
at 757.
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gress in 2017 on the growing concern about balance-billing
costs, “specifically noting consumer concerns related to” the
practice.113 Indeed, as evidenced earlier in this Article and also
discussed by the court in Air Evac EMS, Congress devoted significant attention to the assessment and evaluation of air ambulance billing systems, data collection, and policy and rulemaking
in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018.114
Many states have sought to address balance-billing concerns
by attempting to legislate for lower costs or other regulatory
methods, such as “regulating the amount that air ambulances
can charge” patients or attempting to force acceptance of lower
reimbursement rates.115 West Virginia did just that. Through a
complex, multi-layered system, West Virginia passed state legislation that ultimately resulted in a non-negotiable, comparatively
low reimbursement rate for air ambulance services while also
precluding any additional recovery (i.e., balance-billing).116
Air Evac EMS, Inc. is an air ambulance operator, a registered
air carrier, and a provider of air ambulance services in West Virginia.117 After years of objecting to West Virginia’s regulations,
Air Evac filed suit against state administrators to enjoin the regulatory scheme.118 Air Evac filed a successful motion for summary
judgment, which was then appealed to the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit.119
On appeal, two primary issues were addressed: (1) whether
Air Evac had Article III standing to challenge the regulations;
and (2) whether West Virginia’s regulatory scheme was in violation of, and thus preempted by, the express preemption clause
in the ADA.120
The court disposed of the first issue, West Virginia’s claim that
Air Evac lacked standing, rather quickly.121 The court noted that
Id.
See id.
115 Id. at 757–58.
116 See id. at 758. The details of the regulations West Virginia enacted are not
particularly relevant for the purposes here and thus an in-depth discussion is
omitted. Primarily, however, West Virginia used the state’s workers’ compensation and state-employee benefit system to develop a favorable regulatory scheme
with respect to lower medical reimbursements and payments in connection with
services for operations like air ambulances. See id.
117 Id. at 755, 758–59.
118 Id. at 759.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 759–60.
113
114
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the “causal connection between the [state’s] regulations” and
Air Evac’s lowered reimbursements was “undeniable,” and thus
a sufficient “injury” had been identified to confer standing upon
Air Evac.122
The second issue was more significant. It is clear that the ADA
has an express preemption clause that specifically prohibits
states from enacting laws with regard to the pricing of air carrier
services.123 Moreover, as the court noted, while the ADA’s preemption language is certainly express, and evidently quite
broad, it is not absolute.124 For example, the ADA’s preemption
clause does not reach individual contractual obligations, nor
does it preempt state laws “with only a tangential relation to an
air carrier’s operations.”125
The court addressed whether the air ambulance industry
comes within the purview of the preemption clause by posing
the relevant question as “whether air ambulances are ‘air carrier[s] who may provide transportation.’”126 The court explained that many courts have confronted that very question
and have uniformly found air ambulances to be “air carriers” for
purposes of the ADA.127 West Virginia argued, however, that the
statute defines “air carriers” to include “common carriers”
which, it alleged, air ambulances are not.128 Air ambulances, after all, do not collect tickets from their customers, for example.
The court rejected this argument as well, however, noting a host
of decisional authority all of which firmly conclude air ambulances qualify as common carriers.129 Ultimately, the court appeared to have little trouble identifying air ambulances as “air
carriers” and common carriers.130 And with the obligatory confirmation that air ambulances “provide air transportation,” the
court concluded that the preemption clause in the ADA reaches
air ambulance providers such as Air Evac.131
Id. at 760.
Id. at 762.
124 Id.
125 Id. (citations omitted).
126 Id. at 763 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (2012)).
127 Id. It is also worth noting that at least one of these other cases referenced by
the court was another Air Evac case from 2018 in the District Court for the Western District of Texas. Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 763–64.
131 Id. at 764–66.
122
123
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The Air Evac EMS court then provided a detailed analysis of
West Virginia’s statutory scheme and concluded that it both “relate[s] to a price, route or service” as well as has the “force and
effect of law.”132 Having done so, the court concluded that West
Virginia’s statutory scheme is preempted by the ADA.133
Notably, the court offered West Virginia some conciliatory advice, suggesting that it would be “wrong to conclude that the
ADA envisions no role for states like West Virginia moving forward,” emphasizing the state’s ability to “exert its considerable
market power to obtain more favorable terms.”134 The court
stated:
[t]his is not to say that West Virginia cannot, moving forward,
bargain for lower payments to air ambulance companies. It
would be permissible for the state to use its considerable
purchasing power as the insurer of state employees to negotiate
better rates up front or limit reimbursements for air ambulance
services after the fact.135

V.

FEDERAL JURISDICTION

One notable federal jurisdiction case is also currently pending
before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Riggs v. Airbus
Helicopters Inc.136 The litigation arises from a crash of an Airbus
EC130 B4 helicopter on February 10, 2018, during a sightseeing
tour of the Grand Canyon.137 The crash occurred near Peach
Springs, Arizona, and resulted in multiple fatal injuries.138
The plaintiffs, the estate and family of one of the deceased
passengers, filed the underlying action for strict products liability and negligence against, among others, the manufacturer and
operator, in state court in the District Court of Clark County
Nevada.139 The suit alleges, among other things, a design defect
theory against defendant Airbus Helicopters, Inc. (AHI), claiming the subject helicopter did not meet improved crash resisId. at 766–69.
Id. at 770.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 769.
136 See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Riggs v. Airbus Helicopters, Inc., No. 1816396 (9th Cir. Sept. 25, 2018), 2018 WL 4830297. Wilson Elser represents codefendant and appellee, Papillon Airways, Inc. and related parties, in both the
underlying litigation and on appeal before the Ninth Circuit.
137 Id. at *2.
138 See id. at *2–3.
139 Id. at *3.
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tance standards that require incorporating certain fuel system
design features.140 AHI removed the matter to federal court,
which was followed by motions to remand the case, filed by both
the plaintiffs and the other defendants.141 In July 2018, the district court issued an order remanding the case, which AHI then
appealed to the Ninth Circuit.142
On appeal, AHI claimed that federal jurisdiction is appropriate under a statutory doctrine known as “Federal Officer Jurisdiction,” codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).143 The federal
officer statute states in the pertinent part:
(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution that is commenced in a
State court and that is against or directed to any of the following may be removed by them to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the
place wherein it is pending:
(1) The United States or any agency thereof or any officer
(or any person acting under that officer) of the United
States or of any agency thereof, in an official or individual capacity, for or relating to any act under color of
such office or on account of any right, title or authority
claimed under any Act of Congress for the apprehension or punishment of criminals or the collection of the
revenue.144

The statute, generally speaking, provides a vehicle for removing a case to federal court if the conduct at issue was engaged in
by a federal officer or agent acting under color of that authority.
On appeal, AHI asserted that the alleged design changes at issue
in plaintiffs’ claims would have required a Supplemental Type
Certificate (STC) be approved by the FAA.145 Further, AHI argued that the FAA gave it “Organization Designation Authorization” (ODA), or “ODA” status, providing AHI some delegated
FAA functions and authority.146 As an ODA holder, AHI argued,
it performed authorized, delegated functions normally reserved
for the FAA, including authorization to evaluate and issue
STCs.147 Consequently, AHI asserted that its ODA status makes it
140
141
142

See id.
Id.
See id. An order to remand is appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1447(d). Id.

at *1.
143
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Id. at *4.
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2012).
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 136, at *51.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *14.
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a functional representative of the FAA with respect to whether
an STC was or should have been issued, and therefore AHI’s
“actions” in this regard were undertaken as a “federal officer.”148
The respondents, plaintiffs, and remaining defendants reasserted the position taken by the district court and argued that
AHI may have complied with existing federal regulations, but
compliance does not equate with “acting” as a federal officer.149
The respondents argued that an FAA ODA status is insufficient
to categorically make all conduct of the designee federal-officer
conduct.150 Respondents suggested that permitting federal jurisdiction on the basis AHI suggests would greatly expand the
scope of federal jurisdiction generally.151 Further, the respondents asserted that several additional elements must be satisfied
for federal officer jurisdiction—elements, which they contended, AHI could not meet. These include, for example, demonstrating a causal nexus between the plaintiffs’ claims and the
alleged actions of AHI at issue,152 and whether AHI has a colorable federal defense, which in this case, AHI argued is federal
preemption.153
Ultimately, while the outcome of the Riggs matter will determine whether the case proceeds in federal or state court, the
implications of the decision are more significant. As noted, the
case remains pending in the Ninth Circuit and arguments were
heard on February 14, 2019.154
VI.

CONCLUSION

In the past year, several interesting issues have arisen in the
field of aviation law and, as noted above, many remain pending
as of the date this Article was written. The extensive scope of the
FAA Reauthorization Act, for example, not only reveals the implementation of a variety of new rules and regulations but also
provides insight into the areas of Congressional concern and import spanning the aviation world as we move into a more technological age.
See generally id.
See id. at *19.
150 See id. at *23.
151 See id. at *21.
152 Id. at *45–46.
153 Id. at *47–48.
154 Riggs v. Airbus Helicopters, Inc., No. 18-16396 (9th Cir. argued Feb. 14,
2019).
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